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Abstract
Marine capture fishery resources are declining, and demand for them is rising. These 
trends are suspected to incite conflict, but their effects have not been quantitatively 
examined. We applied a multi- model ensemble approach to a global database of 
international fishery conflicts between 1974 and 2016 to test the supply- induced 
scarcity hypothesis (diminishing supplies of fishery resources increase fisheries con-
flict), the demand- induced scarcity hypothesis (rising demand for fishery resources 
increases fisheries conflict), and three alternative political and economic hypotheses. 
While no single indicator was able to fully explain international conflict over fishery 
resources, we found a positive relationship between increased conflict over fishery 
resources and higher levels of per capita GDP for the period 1975– 1996. For the 
period 1997– 2016, we found evidence supporting the demand- induced scarcity hy-
pothesis, and the notion that an increase in supply of fishery resources is linked to an 
increase in conflict occurrence. By identifying significant predictors of international 
fisheries conflict, our analysis provides useful information for policy approaches for 
conflict anticipation and management.
K E Y W O R D S
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1  | INTRODUC TION
Climate change and global population growth are projected to have 
far- reaching effects on systems of food production and natural 
resource management. A combination of changes in fish stock dis-
tributions and increasing demand for fish as food suggests a high 
potential for increasing conflict over fisheries. Recent investigations 
into fisheries conflict report that it is far from uncommon at both 
local and international scales, and that its occurrence and potential 
drivers are increasing (Mendenhall et al., 2020; Spijkers et al., 2019; 
Glaser et al., 2018; Pinsky, 2018). Fishery conflicts are often entan-
gled with territorial disputes, as was the case for the infamous Cod 
Wars (Nemeth et al., 2014; Spijkers et al., 2019). Some fisheries con-
flicts are marked primarily by diplomatic measures, such as fishing 
or trade bans, while others are marked by more hostile acts, such 
as the attack of foreign vessels (Bailey, 1996; Spijkers et al., 2019). 
Current examples of fishery conflict include the so- called “mackerel 
war” between Norway, the European Union (EU), Iceland and the 
Faroe Islands, which erupted in 2007 when the North- east Atlantic 
mackerel (Scomber scombrus, Scombridae) stock shifted its distribu-
tion (Spijkers & Boonstra 2017, Gänsbauer et al. 2016). At the end 
of 2020, the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) suspended Atlanto- 
Scandian herring (Clupea harengus, Clupeidae) and blue whiting 
(Micromesistius poutassou, Gadidae), fisheries as a consequence of 
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the continuing international disagreement over catch quotas and 
sharing arrangements. Another example is conflict over the rich fish-
ing grounds of the South China Sea, a strategic commodity given 
that fisheries play a vital role in ensuring food security in the region 
(Dupont & Baker, 2014). Importantly, fishers may find themselves 
on the frontlines of international disputes as the surrounding states 
fail to resolve competing claims over parts of the ocean and its re-
sources (ibid. 2014).
An important endeavour for fishery conflict and governance 
scholars has been to parse out what might be driving disputes. 
Inspiration for understanding conflict can be drawn from the lit-
erature on natural resources and conflict more generally. Formal 
analysis of the role of resources in conflict emerged in the 1960s 
and 1970s (see works by Hardin (1968), Ehrlich (1968)) (Floyd & 
Matthew, 2013). The early environmental security literature (devel-
oped during the late 1980s and early 1990s) proposed an analytical 
framework that identified resource scarcity as the primary reason 
for conflict over land or freshwater (Homer- Dixon, 1991, 1994). The 
“scarcity hypothesis” holds that a decreased availability of resources, 
either through increased demand or diminished supply, height-
ens the likelihood of conflict— henceforth referred to, respectively, 
as the demand and supply- induced scarcity hypotheses (Homer- 
Dixon, 1991, 1994). Later studies linked resource abundance and en-
vironmental change, driven by natural variability or climate change, 
to conflict (Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009; Welsch, 2008). Many 
scholars, often from the field of political ecology, disputed these 
environmentally deterministic accounts of conflict, and instead doc-
umented the complex relationship between resources and conflicts, 
and in particular, contextual factors such as vulnerable livelihoods, 
institutional failures or weak states (Dalby, 2014; Le Billon, 2001; Le 
Billon & Duffy, 2018; Peluso & Watts, 2001). Results from studies of 
linkages between the environment and conflict have varied widely. 
Despite this inconsistent evidence base, the narrative of resource 
conflicts associated with rapidly increasing demand for raw mate-
rials and growing resource shortages is common in policy and is in-
cluded in many briefs for decision- makers (for example, UNFT, 2012) 
(Dalby, 2014).
The scarcity hypothesis has also become common within the liter-
ature on fisheries conflict (although some studies flag the indirect role 
of scarcity and importance of other variables e.g. Mendenhall et al., 
2020; Jiminez et al., 2019; Glaser et al., 2018; Dupont & Baker, 2014; 
Bavinck, 2005). This emphasis on scarcity must be interpreted in the 
context of global fisheries dynamics, where global catches increased 
from the 1960s to the 1990s and then levelled off and declined 
(Garibaldi, 2012; Pauly & Zeller, 2016). The decline in the availability 
of fish, the basic premise goes, drove conflict (Penney et al., 2017; 
Mitchell et al., 2012; Nyman et al., 2013; Stalley, 2003; Zhang, 2012).
In addition to declining catches, another potential instigator of 
fisheries conflict is climate change (Mendenhall et al. 2020; Pinsky 
et al., 2018; Pecl et al., 2017). Climate change is leading to increases 
in sea temperature as well as changes in salinity, ocean currents, 
pH and oxygen, impacting fish stock dynamics and altering depth 
and geographical distributions (Free et al. 2019; Cheung, 2018; 
Hughes et al., 2017; Poloczanska et al., 2013). Recent projections 
of the shifting distribution patterns of commercially important ma-
rine species under climate change have led researchers to suggest 
that conflict might be more likely in the future as species enter 
new Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) (Oremus et al. 2020; Pinsky 
et al., 2018; Spijkers & Boonstra 2017). In this sense, climate change 
can be conceptualized as a rendition of the scarcity hypothesis, 
where a change in the relative access to fisheries of different groups 
to a resource causes conflict. The concern is that an absolute decline 
in fish, whether due to overfishing, mismanagement or redistribution 
in catch caused by climate change may intensify the risk of future 
conflict. Although Hendrix and Glaser (2011) performed a quantita-
tive study on the consequences of conflict on fish catch (i.e. opposite 
directionality), the scarcity hypothesis has not yet been rigorously 
tested on marine fishery conflict data (contrary to freshwater con-
flict data sets; see Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2014; Dinar et al., 2015; 
Yoffe et al., 2004). Moreover, no studies have employed such data 
sets to test other hypotheses, such as whether social or economic 
factors regulate fisheries conflict.
Here, we provide the first such analysis by testing five differ-
ent hypotheses from the environmental security literature that link 
natural resources to conflict. In addition to the demand and supply 
scarcity hypotheses, we include three alternative hypotheses that 
consider economic and social conditions:
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Hypotheses 1 Demand- induced- scarcity. As national demand 
for fishery products (both wild catch and aquaculture) increases, 
the number of conflicts over fishery resources a country engages 
in with another country increases. This hypothesis is tested through 
three aspects of demand for fishery products: increased demand as 
a result of a growing population (the Malthusian hypothesis), a rising 
per capita consumer demand for fish as food, or demand for fishery 
resources as a source of income.
Hypotheses 2 Supply- induced- scarcity. As the domestic supply 
of fishery products (both wild catch and aquaculture) decreases, the 
number of conflicts over fishery resources a country engages in with 
another country increases.
Hypotheses 3 Democracy level. As the level of democracy of 
a country increases, political stability is enhanced, creating a paci-
fying effect on international relations, and the number of conflicts 
over fishery resources a country engages in with another country 
decreases.
Hypotheses 4 Macroeconomic performance. As the economic 
development and macroeconomic performance of a state increase, 
the number of conflicts over fishery resources a country engages in 
with another country decreases.
Hypotheses 5 Military expenditure. As the military expenditure 
of a country increases, it is able to engage in more policing, and the 
number of conflicts over fishery resources a country engages in with 
another country increases.
Because fisheries conflicts can extend over multiple years, we 
use conflict at a previous time point as a predictor of conflict (Hauge 
& Ellingsen, 1998). Although not connected to a specific hypothesis, 
we therefore also account for prior fisheries conflict.
By testing these five hypotheses and identifying which variables 
are significant predictors of historical international fisheries conflict, 
we seek to parse out what might be driving fisheries conflict— a nec-
essary step to develop knowledge that can support adequate ap-
proaches for conflict anticipation and management.
2  | MATERIAL S AND METHODS
We evaluated how a set of seven predictors related to the num-
ber of fisheries conflicts a country engaged in with another coun-
try in a given year. The seven variables were proxies for the five 
hypotheses laid out previously (Table 1). These five specific hy-
potheses were chosen on the basis that they have often been 
tested for in previous academic work on conflict over other natu-
ral resources.
We used the International Fisheries Conflict Database (IFCD) 
(Spijkers et al., 2019) as our response data set. We first discuss 
the response data set and structure, then lay out the rationale 
behind the 5 hypotheses and the chosen predictors, and finally 
explain how we used a multi- model approach to establish which 
variables are significant predictors of fisheries conflict despite 
uncertainty in model structure and the complexity of the inter-
national conflict.
2.1 | Response variable data source: International 
Fisheries Conflict Database
Our response variable was the number of international fishery con-
flict events a country engages in per year. We use the IFCD as our 
data source, which was set up to explore international conflicts 
over marine fishery resources by using detailed records of interac-
tions between countries (Spijkers et al., 2019). The IFCD currently 
contains 542 reported international fishery conflict events that oc-
curred between 1974 and 2016 of five differing intensities (see Table 
S1) and were identified through media reports from the LexisNexis 
Academic database (ibid. 2019). Following Spijkers et al., 2019, an 
international fishery conflict is a dispute:
a. actualized through “conflict events,” which are actions or be-
haviours ranging from an exchange of statements to severe mil-
itary involvement and casualties (as defined by the “intensity of 
observed behaviour” scale, see Table S1).
b. occurring between two or more states and/or vessels that fly 
their flag;
c. related to access to a fishery resource or management of a fish-
ery resource;
d. potentially occurring in the larger context of a maritime territorial 
conflict, where the fishery resource contributes to some degree 
to that territorial conflict;
e. spanning over any length of time.
We removed the EU from our analysis as it did not fit the 
country- level predictor data sets. We also removed Palestine, 
Western Sahara and the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) from our 
data set as there were no data available for these regions for any of 
the predictor variables.
Finally, because we were interested in exploring if national charac-
teristics (related to supply and demand of fish, and additional economic 
and social conditions) influence the amount of fisheries conflict that a 
country experiences, we used country- level conflict data as the level 
of observation, precluding the use of dyad analysis to explore causes 
of conflict. Though monadic analyses in peace and conflict studies are 
not uncommon (Sakuwa 2017), and there is academic interest in how 
domestic or national factors regulate fisheries conflict (Ásgeirsdóttir 
2007), it needs to be noted that country dyad data are commonly used 
(Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2014; Dinar et al., 2015). Where dyadic analy-
ses are able to grasp important relational aspects of conflict, monadic 
analyses allow us to investigate the importance of single- state attri-
butes of interest (such as if a country experiences growth in demand 
for fish, will it experience more conflict over fish?).
2.2 | Details on hypotheses and predictor data sources
We first tested the demand- induced- scarcity hypothesis (H1) 
by looking at the relationship between demand and conflict (see 
Brashares et al., 2014; Choukri & North, 1975; Pomeroy et al., 2016; 
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Seter et al., 2016; Yoffe et al., 2003). Specifically, we tested whether 
increased demand for fish was linked to fisheries conflict through 
three different aspects of demand for fishery products. The first 
aspect is demand for fish as a source of food, measured through 
the “protein supply quantity” variable. The protein supply quantity 
reflects “apparent consumption,” which is the per capita food fish 
supplies available for human consumption, and it includes both cul-
tured and wild fish in the data. The second aspect is demand for fish 
as a source of income, measured through the “employment in the 
fishing sector” variable, which includes all commercial, industrial and 
subsistence fishers. The third aspect is increased demand for fish 
due to domestic population size increase (the Malthusian hypoth-
esis) (Table 1).
Second, we tested the supply- induced- scarcity hypothesis (H2) 
by looking at the relationship between supply and conflict (see 
Brashares et al., 2014; Choukri & North, 1975; Homer- Dixon, 1991, 
1994; Pomeroy et al., 2016; Seter et al., 2016) through the variable 
“domestic supply quantity” (Table 1). If H2 is supported, we would 
expect to see that as the domestic supply of fishery products de-
creases, the number of conflicts over fishery resources a country 
engages in with another country increases. The inverse of H2 is the 
resource abundance (or resource curse) hypothesis, which holds that 
a higher prevalence of natural resources has negative effects on 
for example economic development or democratic governance, for 
example, breeding corruption and conflict (De Soysa, 2002; Frerks 
et al., 2014; Owusu, 2018).
Though we were primarily interested in testing H1 and H2, we 
also integrated three alternative socio- economic hypotheses into 
the analysis. These additional hypotheses are not exhaustive, but 
represent commonly tested hypotheses in the conflict literature 
(see for example Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2020; Bremer, 1992; De 
Soysa, 2002; Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998) for which data were available.
First, we tested the democracy level hypothesis (H3) by looking 
at the relationship between the level of democracy in a country and 
conflict (see Bodea et al., 2016; Van Holt et al. 2016; Mcclanahan 
et al., 2015; Hegre, 2014; Brochmann & Gleditsch, 2012; Brochmann 
& Hensel, 2009; Boehmer, 2008; Quackenbush & Rudy, 2009; 
Salehyan, 2008; Wolf et al., 2003; Oneal & Russett, 1997; 
Fukuyama, 1992). We tested this using the “democracy level” vari-
able (Table 1). The commonly hypothesized relationship is that do-
mestic institutions influence foreign policies, making democracies 
less likely to initiate conflict. However, because previous studies 
specifically on maritime conflict have shown that democracies, 
or powerful autocratic countries, are significantly more likely to 
TA B L E  1   Hypotheses and linked predictors and their data sources
Hypothesis Predictor Predictor description Predictor source
Demand- induced 
scarcity
Protein supply quantity The apparent consumption is calculated as production minus 
non- food uses and fish exports. Fish imports are added, and 
changes in stocks taken into account. Measured in grams per 
capita per day of protein consumed from fish products.
FAO, food balances
Employment in the 
fishing sector
This variable includes all commercial, industrial and subsistence 
fishers, operating in freshwater, brackish water, and marine 
waters to catch and land any aquatic animals and plants. 
Because the data set was only available from 1995, we only 












The quantity of fishery products for domestic utilization is 
calculated by adding the production of fisheries products to 
imports of fisheries products, subtracting fishery exports and 
taking into account the changes in stocks. Fisheries products 




Democracy Level of democracy Scale ranging from 0 to 10 where 0 is least democratic and 
10 most democratic, covering both procedural (e.g. electoral 
process) and structural (e.g. rule of law) element of democracy.




GDP per capita Measured in value, USD. World Bank, world 
development 
indicators
Military expenditure Military expenditure Military expenditure includes all current and capital 
expenditures on the armed forced (SIPRI n.d.).
Measured in percentage of GDP.
Quality of Governance 
database
Note: For a more elaborate description of all the predictor variables, see SI: Data sources.
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experience conflict than dictatorships, we adopt this hypothesis as 
well (Daniels & Mitchell, 2017; DeSombre & Barkin, 2011; Mitchell 
& Prins, 1999).
Second, we tested the macroeconomic performance hypothesis 
(H4) by looking at the relationship between the country's macroeco-
nomic performance and conflict (see Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2020; 
Bodea et al., 2016; Bremer, 1992; Brochmann, 2012; Hauge & 
Ellingsen, 1998; Yoffe et al., 2003) (Table 1). Lower GDP per capita 
is reportedly one of the most robust predictors of social conflict, 
and a common hypothesis is that, as the development and macro-
economic performance of a state increases, the number of conflicts 
over fishery resources a country engages in decreases (Bernauer & 
Böhmelt, 2020; De Soysa, 2002). However, a previous study spe-
cifically on maritime conflict has shown that states with higher lev-
els of economic development are more prone to conflict (Daniels & 
Mitchell, 2017). Therefore, the hypothesis here is that more devel-
oped economies have more extensive fishing operations, and are 
thus more likely to experience international fisheries conflict (ibid. 
2017).
Third, we tested the military expenditure hypothesis (H5) by 
looking for a relationship between military expenditure and con-
flict (see Bodea et al., 2016; Bremer, 1992; Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998) 
(Table 1). Particularly for fisheries conflict, military expenditure can 
be linked to a country's strengthened naval presence to protect 
strategically important waters by conducting military exercises or 
building military outposts on disputed islands (Wirth, 2016; Song, 
2015). This could, therefore, suggest that greater naval capabilities 
and more intensive policing would lead to a greater number of inter-
national conflicts.
All of the predictors in Table 1 occur in the same year as the 
dependent variable, international fisheries conflict. However, we 
also acknowledge that fisheries conflict in the previous year may be 
an important predictor for conflict in the next year, a variable we 
call prior conflict. Indeed, in studies parsing out drivers of conflict, 
conflict occurring in the previous year is often a strong predictor 
for experiencing conflict in the next year (Ciccone, 2011; Hauge & 
Ellingsen, 1998; Theisen, 2008). To test this, we use the conflict data 
set lagged by one year and dropped the first time point (year 1974) 
from our conflict data set (Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998; Salehyan, 2009).
To assess the potential effects of multicollinearity in our mod-
els, we used pairwise relationship correlation coefficients (Pearson 
correlations, no coefficient greater than |0.7|, see Figures S1– S2) 
and variance inflation factor (VIF) estimates (scores lower than 
2.5). Based on previous literature, we also considered population 
size and more precise measures of governance quality (the World 
Governance Indicators) as predictors. However, population size 
(source: World Bank) violated the Pearson correlation criterion (high 
correlation with the employment data set), so it was excluded as 
a predictor. Additionally, the World Governance Indicators (source: 
World Bank) were excluded as predictors as they violated the 
Pearson correlation criterion (high correlation with democracy level 
and GDP per capita).
2.3 | Analysis
2.3.1 | Establishing time periods for analysis
Based on previous research, we suspected that over time, there might 
be two different periods within the data with different underlying 
dynamics. There are two qualitative reasons to analyse the history of 
fisheries conflict in two periods. First, the conflict trends in Spijkers 
et al., (2019) suggest that conflict has not had a continuous trend 
over time, showing a more rapid increase in conflict from around 
the year 2000. Moreover, Spijkers et al., (2019) concluded that, be-
fore the turn of the century, fisheries conflict involved mostly North 
American and European countries fighting over specific stocks, with 
conflicts being characterized largely by low- intensity events of a 
diplomatic nature (see Table S1) (Spijkers et al., 2019). The nature 
of the conflict events altered markedly around the turn of the mil-
lennium, as fisheries conflict then primarily involved Asian countries 
(encompassing nearly half of all conflict events after the year 2000) 
clashing over multiple and non- specified species, with conflict often 
triggered by illegal fishing and more often exhibiting violent interac-
tions (Spijkers et al., 2019).
Second, because we have a primary interest in exploring how the 
available supply of fishery resources might influence the likelihood of 
international fisheries conflict (scarcity hypothesis), it is important to 
take into consideration the global trends in available fishery resources. 
Global fisheries catch patterns show a clear peak in the mid- 1990s 
(Pauly & Zeller, 2016 specifically report year 1996) and visible de-
clines since. This break in the trend (with increasing global supplies 
of wild- caught fish up to around 1996, and declining supplies there-
after) suggests that breaking the data set up into two periods allows 
us to explore how such a change in the global resource base may 
have influenced incidences of conflict. Moreover, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entered into force in 
1996, formally establishing the limits of the EEZ and fundamentally 
transforming global fisheries governance. The changing nature of in-
ternational fisheries conflict, the faster rate of increase in conflict over 
fishery resources in recent years, the altered availability in global sup-
ply of fish catch, and deep changes in fisheries governance signal the 
importance of examining different time periods of fisheries conflict.
To determine whether there are statistical breakpoints in the 
IFCD to confirm our qualitative intuitions, we ran a piecewise re-
gression model (r package: segmented (Muggeo, 2008)) on the 
number of conflicts between 1974 and 2016. Using the raw con-
flict data over time, 1997 and 2000 emerged as breakpoints (see 
Figure S3 and Table S2). After applying a rolling mean of three years 
over the data, 1997 and 2002 emerged as breakpoints in the data 
set (see Figure S4 and Table S3). As both models suggest 1997 as 
a clear break, and because 1997 coincides with a change in trend 
in available supply of fishery resources (a predictor of interest), we 
split the data set at that year and explored whether the different 
time periods (before and after 1997) might be driven by differ-
ent predictors. To visualize both time periods and the countries 
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experiencing the most conflict, we built two world maps showing 
the count of conflict for each country in the analysis (r package: 
ggplot).
2.3.2 | Identifying important predictors: a multi- 
model approach
Exploring complex systems, where there are multiple potential pre-
dictors, often precludes the search for a single “best” model because 
of the high uncertainty regarding what combination of variables are 
important (Gregr & Chan, 2015). Determining a single best model 
can bias resulting inference or generate misleading results (for exam-
ple, variables not included in the selected model are deemed unim-
portant where they may be influential in reality) (Lukacs et al., 2010; 
Raftery et al., 1993). Beyond the parametric uncertainty about which 
variables to include in a model, there is considerable uncertainty in 
choosing model design (sometimes referred to as “structural uncer-
tainty” (Gregr & Chan, 2015; Tebaldi & Knutti, 2007)). To address 
parametric and structural uncertainty, we used a multi- model ap-
proach which allowed us to benefit from individual model strengths 
and guard against their limitations, while explicitly acknowledging 
different model structures and determining results robust to high 
uncertainty. In short, we used a multi- model ensemble to determine 
signals that cut through deep uncertainty in complex systems and 
model assumptions. We used three different approaches to identify 
significant predictors of fisheries conflict.
1. Boosted regression trees
Our first model, boosted regression trees (BRT), is a non- 
parametric tree- based model which recursively fits multiple trees 
(i.e. it combines multiple models or “trees” where a single tree re-
lates a response to their predictors by recursive binary splits) with 
the samples randomly drawn from the original data set. It predicts 
the averaged outcome based on the predictions from these multiple 
trees (r packages: dismo (Elith et al., 2008), gbm (Ridgeway, 2013), 
and ggBRT (Jouffray et al., 2019)) (Elith et al., 2008). Because our 
response variable (conflict count per country per year) is a discrete 
count, we used a Poisson distribution. Within the BRT models, one 
can control the tree complexity (i.e. how many levels of interactions 
are fitted), learning rate (which determines the contribution of each 
new tree to the model) and bag fraction (which specifies the pro-
portion of data to be randomly selected while fitting each single 
decision tree) (Elith et al., 2008; Jouffray et al., 2019). The optimal 
parameter settings were selected based on explained deviance.
For BRT, we assessed the cross- validated percent deviance 
explained. The cross- validated percent deviance explained is 
calculated as 1— (cross- validated deviance/mean total deviance) 
(Jouffray, 2019), and is a measure of goodness- of- fit— where 100% 
would indicate a perfect model. We also used BRT to explore the 
relative importance of each predictor. The relative importance of 
each predictor is a ranking metric based on how often it was used 
in the tree for splitting, weighted by the improvement to the model 
as the result of each split and then scaled so the values sum to 
100 (Colin et al., 2017). We considered only the predictors with a 
relative influence above that expected by chance (100/number of 
variables) as significant (Jouffray, 2019). For significant predictors, 
we provide partial dependence plots (PDP) showing the marginal 
effect on the predicted outcome for a given value of the predictor 
(i.e. the instantaneous effect that a change in the predictor vari-
able has on conflict when the other variables are kept constant). 
The x- axis shows the distribution of the data points, and the PDP 
flattens in regions where there is no change, or where there is no 
data available. The y- axis is on the log scale. PDP’s show whether 
the relationship between conflict and a predictor is linear or more 
complex.
The BRT approach offers some important advantages over other 
statistical models. First, it can capture non- linear relationships, 
something different conflict scholars have advocated for to incor-
porate in models (Selby & Hoffman, 2016), and which parametric 
models (i.e. models where the shape of the functional relationships 
between the response and the explanatory variables are predeter-
mined) cannot. Second, BRT accommodates missing data by using 
surrogates, meaning that, if a variable is missing in a data point, the 
decision defers to another variable that is highly correlated with it. 
Third, it is robust against outliers. Last, it automatically incorporates 
interaction effects between predictors (Elith et al., 2008). BRT also 
has some important drawbacks: It depends heavily on the sample 
of data, and even small changes in training data can result in very 
different series of splits, introducing uncertainty into their interpre-
tation; and it can be prone to overfitting (Elith et al., 2008).
2. Generalized linear model
Second, we used a zero- inflated negative binomial general-
ized linear model (GLM), or ZINB GLM. The ZINB GLM (r pack-
age: pscl (Jackman, 2012, Zeileis et al., 2008)) is a two- component 
model. The first component is a count model that predicts some 
zero counts, with zeros representing instances where countries 
could have experienced conflict but did not. The second compo-
nent is a zero- inflation binary model, where the zeros represent 
countries that could not have experienced fisheries conflict in that 
year. Because the ZINB GLM has two components, we deemed a 
predictor significant for the overall model if it is significant for at 
least one of the two components. We chose to run a ZINB GLM 
instead of aggregating conflicts across time to reduce the zeros in 
the conflict data set because we wanted to explicitly incorporate 
instances where conflict does not occur in our models; a limitation 
of many causal studies on natural resources and conflict (Adams 
et al., 2018; Hendrix, 2018). The GLM approach offers a number 
of advantages. Its output is relatively easy to interpret, it offers 
clear understanding of how predictors influence the outcome, and 
it does not assume independence between data points. It is also 
not prone to overfitting. It can; however, show sensitivity to out-
liers. The ZINB GLM model, in particular, can account for excess 
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zeros, which encompasses situations in which countries in our data 
set at a given point in time: (a) did not have the means to protect 
their fishing interests (Daniels & Mitchell, 2017) and, therefore, 
could not engage in conflict or (b) could experience conflict, but 
there was no reporting on occurring conflicts. We use the model 
to assess significance of the predictors, using a p- value of <0.05 
as cut- off. We provide the pseudo- r- squared as a goodness- of- fit 
measure, as the usual r- squared is not provided for GLM (r- squared 
is calculated by ordinary least- squares regression, while GLM uses 
the maximum likelihood estimator). The pseudo- r- squared value 
was obtained using McFadden's method.
3. Generalized linear mixed model
Third, we used a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM), which 
is an extension to the GLM that includes random effects (i.e. ef-
fects that vary among individuals) in addition to fixed effects (i.e. 
effects that are constant across individuals). In our GLMM (r pack-
age: lme4 (Bates et al., 2015)), we used the negative binomial dis-
tribution and the country ID as a random effect to account for any 
non- independence within a country (i.e. within- country correla-
tion). This model includes the possibility that important country- 
specific characteristics may influence the number of conflicts a 
given state engages in, but which we do not have predictors for. 
We used the model to assess significance of the predictors, with a 
p- value of <0.05 as cut- off. We provide the pseudo- r- squared as a 
goodness- of- fit measure, as the usual r- squared is not provided for 
GLMM (r- squared is calculated by ordinary least- squares regres-
sion, while GLMM uses the maximum likelihood estimator). The 
pseudo- r- squared is obtained using the delta method and consid-
ers the variance by both the fixed and random effects.
2.3.3 | Cross model evaluation
For time period 1 (1975– 1996), we used the three models (BRT, ZINB 
GLM and GLMM) to evaluate which predictors are most robust. We 
included all predictors listed above except for employment in the 
fishing sector, as data were not available for time period 1. For time 
period 2 (1997– 2016), we ran the same three models for all predic-
tors, with and without employment, as data were limited to only 
OECD countries as well as Argentina, China, Indonesia, Thailand and 
Chinese Taipei. We assessed robust predictors across those six mod-
els for time period 2.
To evaluate which of the predictors carried the most weight 
across models, we used the following scale:
- Strong support: significance of the predictor across all models 
(i.e. 3/3 for time period 1 or 6/6 models for time period 2).
- Moderate support: significance of the predictor across the major-
ity of models (i.e. minimum of 2/3 models or 4/6 models).
- Low support: significance of the predictor across less than half of 
models (i.e. less than 2/3 of 3/6 models).
- No support: no significance of the predictor in any of the models.
We used conflict at the previous time point as a predictor in part 
to account for temporal autocorrelation. We used Auto Correlation 
Function (ACF) plots to assess whether temporal autocorrelation 
had been removed from our data set with the inclusion of this vari-
able. Because this is pooled data, we ran separate ACF plots for each 
country per model, and found that certain countries in two models 
had residuals from time T- 1 that were still correlated with the re-
siduals from time T (Tables S16– S21). We, therefore, ran these two 
models again, taking out the countries that displayed autocorrelation 
between T- 1 and T. There were no significant differences in model 
results or resulting inferences between these different treatments 
of the data (Tables S22– S23).
When assessing multicollinearity through the VIF scores, we 
found that the GLM model showed VIF scores estimates much 
greater than 2.5 (see Table S4), but all VIF scores were no greater 
than 2.2 within the GLMM (see Table S5) and no greater than 2.2 
within the BRT (see Table S6). Despite multicollinearity in the GLM, 
the consistency of results among all the models suggests that our 
conclusions are sound. We analysed the standardized- residual plots 
of all models (for time periods 1 and 2) to confirm that they did not 
show evidence of heteroscedasticity or trends that would violate 
model assumptions. We also analysed the performance of our mod-
els by comparing model predictions with our actual conflict data, to 
confirm a monotonic relationship between actual and predicted out-
comes in our models.
3  | RESULTS
3.1 | Time period 1 (1975– 1996)
During the first time period, the USA was involved in the greatest 
number of conflict events (n = 98), followed by Canada (n = 97) 
and Spain (n = 35) (Spijkers et al., 2019) (Figure 1). The cross- 
validated percent deviance explained from the BRT model for 
this time period was 40.2%. The pseudo- r- squared for the ZINB 
GLM is 0.36 and the pseudo- r- squared for the GLMM model was 
0.30. Across the three models, prior conflict and GDP per capita 
emerged as influential predictors (Table 2). However, in the GLM 
model, decreased GDP per capita was significantly associated 
with lower levels of conflicts (zero- inflation model), while in the 
other two models, increased GDP per capita was associated with 
more conflicts.
From the PDP, we can see that a country has an increasingly 
higher probability of experiencing conflict as the amount of conflicts 
it engaged in during the previous year increases (Figure 2). The same 
relationship holds for GDP per capita (Figure 2).
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3.2 | Time period 2 (1997– 2016)
Spijkers et al., (2019) found a greater number of conflicts in Asia dur-
ing time period 2, mainly involving China (n = 70), followed by Japan 
(n = 53) and South Korea (n = 44) (Figure 3). The cross- validated 
percent deviance explained from the BRT model for time period 
2, including fisheries employment as a predictor, was 31.8%. The 
pseudo- r- squared for the ZINB GLM with fisheries employment as 
predictor was 0.68, and for the GLMM model, the pseudo- r- squared 
was 0.23. Protein supply emerged as an influential predictor across 
the three models (see Table 3). Prior conflict was significant in the 
BRT and ZINB GLM, while population growth was significant in both 
ZINB GLM and GLMM.
Due to limited data availability for “fisheries employment,” we 
also ran the three models excluding it as a predictor (see Table 4). The 
cross- validated percent deviance explained from the BRT model was 
33.2%. The pseudo- r- squared for the ZINB GLM became 0.33, and 
the pseudo- r- squared for the GLMM model remained unchanged. 
F I G U R E  1   Map of countries experiencing conflict over fishery resources for time period 1 (1975– 1996). Figure appears in colour in the 
online version only [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]




GLMMCount model Zero- inflation
Relative influence Coefficient (Standard error) Coefficient (Standard error)
Coefficient 
(Standard error)
Prior conflict 48.430055 1.53617 (0.47588) −4.13908 (1.66194) 1.5205 (0.6758)
GDP per capita 21.850888 −0.20168 (0.79031) −6.22271 (1.69162) 3.0714 (0.8773)
Domestic supply 9.167361 1.20459 (0.92643) −3.22221 (1.46331) 2.4764 (1.3486)
Population growth 7.692897 −0.42474 (1.82226) 2.22541 (2.00704) −2.6453 (1.7593)
Protein from fish 5.454625 −1.86071 (1.35763) 2.83389 (1.93507) −2.4212 (1.7904)
Democracy level 3.960203 1.18338 (0.77723) 1.40043 (0.94796) 0.2996 (0.7024)
Military expenditure 3.443970 −1.19697 (3.42074) 1.71233 (3.06762) −2.6367 (2.3191)
Note: Bold variables are significant for the model and highlighted variables are those that have moderate to strong support across all models (as 
per our evaluation scale). Significant for the ZINB GLM and the GLMM mean the predictor has a p- value of <0.05. For the BRT model, significance 
indicates that the predictor crossed the relative influence cut- off in order to not be expected by mere chance (14.3%). Note: the relative influence 
does not indicate if the relationship is positive or negative. See SI: Tables S7– S9 for raw output from all three models.
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The three models without fisheries employment as predictor found 
convergence on the importance of three predictors: prior conflict, 
domestic supply quantity, and amount of protein consumed from 
fish (see Table 4).
From the PDP, we can see that a country has an increasingly 
higher probability of experiencing conflict as the amount of conflicts 
it engaged in during the previous year increases, yet that probability 
remains the same beyond about four past conflict events (Figure 4). 
The same relationship holds for domestic supply. We also found 
that as the quantity of protein derived from fish consumption in a 
country increases, so does the occurrence of conflict over fishery 
resources. The PDP shows that this relationship mainly holds true 
for higher levels of protein consumption from fish. The findings for 
both time periods are summarized in Table 5.
4  | DISCUSSION
A deeper understanding of international fisheries conflict is critical 
to conflict anticipation and management. However, we did not find 
a single hypothesis that could fully explain increases in international 
fishery conflict. Here we link our results to broader understandings 
of fisheries conflict and governance.
The results show that the nature of international fisheries con-
flict has changed over time (supporting previous findings by Spijkers 
et al., 2019) and that the predictors of the phenomenon are not general-
izable from any one of the tested hypotheses. Only one predictor, prior 
conflict, remained significant across both time periods. Particularly 
during time period 1, prior conflict was a strong predictor. During this 
time, many of the fisheries conflicts were prolonged, low- intensity 
F I G U R E  2   PDP for time period 1 showing the marginal effect on the predicted outcome for a given value of the predictor. Relative 
influence of each predictor is reported between parentheses. Grey tick marks along the x- axis indicate observed data points. Values along 
the y- axis indicate count of conflict on a log scale. Figure appears in colour in the online version only [Colour figure can be viewed at 
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
F I G U R E  3   Map of countries experiencing conflict over fishery resources for time period 2 (1997– 2016). Figure appears in colour in the 
online version only [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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events between the same set of countries (Spijkers et al., 2019). For 
time period 2, experiencing conflict in the previous year remained an 
important predictor for conflict in a given year, but the predictor had 
less predictive power than for time period 1 in the BRT model. This is 
likely due to international fisheries conflicts not lasting as long during 
time period 2, but being more intense (Spijkers et al., 2019).
Aside from prior conflict, the time periods exhibited different sig-
nificant predictors for conflict. From 1975 to 1996, a time in which 
marine fisheries catch as well as fishing effort steadily increased, 
prior conflict and high levels of GDP per capita had a significant 
relationship with conflict. From 1997 to 2016, when more conflict 
occurred in Asia and global yields from fishing had started to stabi-
lize and decrease, we found evidence that increased demand and an 
increase in the supply of fishery resources were linked to an increase 
in conflict occurrence. For a discussion on the predictors with no to 
low evidence for either time period, see SI: Low evidence predictors.
4.1 | Findings for time period 1 (1975– 1996)
During time period 1, marine fisheries catch as well as fishing ef-
fort steadily increased, and global catches peaked in 1996 at 86 
million tonnes (Anticamera et al., 2011; Pauly & Zeller, 2016; Worm 
& Branch, 2012). Conflicts mainly involved North American and 
European countries, often occurred around a single species, and were 
mostly characterized by low conflict intensity (such as hostile verbal 




GLMMCount model Zero- inflation
Relative influence Coefficient (Standard error) Coefficient (Standard error)
Coefficient 
(Standard error)
Prior conflict 31.122203 4.9257 (1.3211) 42.969 (31.626) 1.8789 (1.2283)
Domestic supply 28.485425 3.5428 (1.9415) 2.402 (10.464) 1.2808 (1.1220)
Protein from fish 14.416985 2.6083 (0.6561) 20.893 (14.936) 3.2177 (0.9302)
Population growth 4.631676 7.4385 (3.5087) −455.880 (−455.880) 8.4098 (4.1423)
GDP per capita 8.245806 0.4451 (0.5517) 3.259 (16.268) 0.8056 (0.7576)
Democracy level 3.149263 −0.8000 (0.5763) 54.044 (35.815) −1.4527 (0.8401)
Military expenditure 3.877867 12.9729 (5.5463) 824.609 (522.340) 4.1042 (8.3194)
Fisheries employment 6.070774 0.8768 (0.6174) 78.641 (50.861) 0.9417 (0.8313)
Note: Bold variables are significant for the model and highlighted variables are those that have moderate to strong support across all models (as per 
our evaluation scale), including the models without fisheries employment as a predictor (see Table 4). Significant for the ZINB GLM and the GLMM 
mean the predictor has a p- value of <0.05. For the BRT model, significance indicates that the predictor crossed the relative influence cut- off in order 
to not be expected by mere chance (12.5%). Note: the relative influence does not indicate if the relationship is positive or negative. See SI: Tables 
S10– S12 for raw output from all three models.




GLMMCount model Zero- inflation
Relative influence Coefficient (Standard error) Coefficient (Standard error)
Coefficient 
(Standard error)
Prior conflict 30.766761 5.08320 (0.98114) −45.3797 (21.7630) 4.98655 (1.06101)
Domestic supply 28.598450 3.95801 (1.01323) −71.5552 (25.4029) 3.79510 (1.32148)
Protein from fish 16.238776 1.19910 (0.53838) 1.4120 (1.6591) 2.17422 (0.85789)
Population growth 7.393651 −0.34175 (1.82244) −1.9172 (3.2316) −0.9966 (1.9691)
GDP per capita 9.217082 0.16370 (0.51997) −1.7705 (1.6184) 0.71646 (0.67789)
Democracy level 3.780293 0.02571 (0.36412) 0.6737 (1.0032) −0.27826 (0.50339)
Military expenditure 4.004987 4.38959 (2.97046) 8.6029 (5.2797) −2.89693 (3.46971)
Note: Bold variables are significant for the model and highlighted variables are those that have moderate to strong support across all models (as per 
our evaluation scale), including the models with fisheries employment as a predictor (see Table 3). Significant for the ZINB GLM and the GLMM mean 
the predictor has a p- value of <0.05. For the BRT model, significance indicates that the predictor crossed the relative influence cut- off in order to not 
be expected by mere chance (14.3%). Note: the relative influence does not indicate if the relationship is positive or negative. See SI: Tables S13– S15 
for raw output from all three models.
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expressions or hostile diplomatic acts) (Spijkers et al., 2019). Examples 
include the Pacific salmon (Genus Oncorhynchus, Salmonidae) dis-
pute between Canada and the USA or the Cod (Gadus morhua, 
Gadidae) wars between France and Canada (Spijkers et al., 2019).
We found that GDP per capita was a significant predictor for 
fisheries conflict in time period 1 (see Table 5). Studies linking natural 
resources such as freshwater to conflict find that decreasing levels 
of GDP per capita (a general indicator of the development and mac-
roeconomic performance of a country) are significant predictors of 
conflict (Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2020; Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998; Yoffe 
et al., 2003). However, focussing on maritime conflict, Daniels and 
Mitchell (2017) reported that more economically developed states 
have greater opportunities to make maritime claims, and thus en-
gage in more conflict. Economically developed states started to de-
limit their maritime spaces in the late 1970s to early 1980s, triggering 
conflict over access to fishing areas (such as the Turbot (Reinhardtius 
hippoglossoides, Pleuronectidae) Wars between Canada and Spain, 
or the fish wars between the USA and Canada over the maritime 
boundary at the Dixon Entrance) (Daniels & Mitchell). Our findings 
support this hypothesis for time period 1, although with some nu-
ance. From our GLM model we find that lower GDP per capita is a 
predictor for not being able to engage in conflicts. This could indicate 
that countries with a lower GDP per capita in this time period did 
not have the economic capacity necessary to actively participate in 
activities related to fisheries to the same degree as more developed 
states. Fisheries in developing countries have only gradually been 
integrated into international markets, yet now contribute a signifi-
cant proportion of fish traded on such markets (Crona et al., 2015; 
FAO, 2018). Being initially isolated from regional and global dynam-
ics may have shielded them from the low- intensity international con-
flicts common to this time period.
4.2 | Findings for time period 2 (1997– 2016)
We found strong support for the demand hypothesis from time pe-
riod 2, more specifically for demand for fish as food (see Table 5). 
We found moderate support for the significance of domestic supply 
(significant across 4 out of 6 models), but because the relationship 
between fish supply and conflict is positive rather than negative (i.e. 
as supply of fish increases, so does conflict), this does not confirm 
the supply- induced scarcity hypothesis. During time period 2, more 
conflict arose in Asia (Spijkers et al., 2019) (Figure 3). The three coun-
tries that experienced most conflict during this period, China, Japan 
F I G U R E  4   PDP for time period 2 showing the marginal effect on the predicted outcome for a given value of the predictor. Relative 
influence of each predictor in is reported between parentheses. Grey tick marks across the top of each plot indicate observed data points 
(along the x- axis). Values along the y- axis indicate count of conflict on a log scale. Figure appears in colour in the online version only [Colour 
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Predictor





Domestic supply Low Positive Moderate Positive
Protein quantity None None Strong Positive
Fishery employment NA NA None None
Population growth None None Low Positive
GDP per capita High Positive None None
Democracy level None None None None
Military expenditure None None Low Positive
Prior conflict High Positive Moderate Positive
Note: The findings for time period 1 are based on 3 models, and the findings of time period 2 are 
based on 6 models (3 with and 3 without the employment variable). High and moderate support 
findings are highlighted.
TA B L E  5   Summary of the findings for 
time period 1 and time period 2
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and South Korea, operate some of the largest Distant Water Fishing 
(DWF) fleets globally (Mallory, 2013; Pauly et al., 2014). During pe-
riod 2, the number of areas open to new fisheries exploitation de-
clined (McClanahan et al., 2015; Swartz et al., 2010) and yields from 
fishing started to stabilize or potentially even decrease (Pauly & 
Zeller, 2016 report a peak in catches in 1996). However, fishing effort 
continued to rise, leading to a global decline in catch- per- unit- effort 
(Mcclanahan et al., 2015; Pauly & Zeller, 2016; Watson et al., 2013; 
Worm & Branch, 2012). Between 1997 and 2016, a shortfall in sup-
ply from collapsing stocks within the EEZ of developed countries was 
increasingly replaced by fish harvested from tropical waters, where 
fisheries are often minimally managed (Mcclanahan et al., 2015). 
China became the largest producer and exporter of fishery products 
worldwide, while the USA became the largest importer (FAO, 2018).
In time period 2, the quantity of fish available for domestic 
consumption had a positive relationship with conflict. The finding 
that an increase in supply of fishery resources to a given country is 
linked to increased conflict for that country goes against the supply- 
induced scarcity hypothesis, which postulates that conflict increases 
when resources decline. It is, however, possible that despite a de-
cline in the wild capture of marine fish, total supply of fishery re-
sources has increased, potentially masking the effect of degrading 
ecosystems on the incidence of conflict. We illustrate this with the 
example of China, the country most in conflict for time 2. As dis-
cussed previously, global yields from wild fish capture had started to 
stabilize or potentially even decrease during time period 2 (Pauly & 
Zeller, 2016). For that same time period, reports indicate that some 
regions have been able to rebuild certain fish stocks, while others 
have experienced stock depletion and overfishing (Béné, 2015).
China is an instructive example of stock depletion and over-
fishing, as 30 percent of its domestic fisheries are reported to have 
collapsed and a further 20 percent to be overexploited (Blomeyer 
et al., 2012). Thus, China has increasingly turned to distant water 
fishing and aquaculture to satisfy its domestic demand (Pauly & 
Zeller, 2016, Pauly et al., 2014, Watson et al. 2017, Anticamara 
et al., 2011). While both of these strategies have allowed China to 
keep its domestic supply quantity (which is made up of both catch 
of wild fish and production of cultured fish) growing despite local 
stock collapses, it has potentially also led to a greater number of con-
flicts over fish. In the 2000s, China's growing DWF fleet operated 
in the EEZs of over 90 countries worldwide (Pauly et al., 2014). As 
of 2014, China's estimated DWF fleet encompassed nearly 4,000 
vessels and is supported by a number of government tax relief pol-
icies and subsidies (for comparison, the USA’s DWF fleet consists 
of roughly 200 ships (Mallory, 2013, 2016)). It is possible that China 
has increasingly experienced conflicts because of the geographic ex-
pansion of their DWF vessels, even operating in foreign EEZs such 
as those of Japan and South Korea, to maintain their catches (Pauly 
et al., 2014). Declines in fish caught in its own EEZ push China to 
source its domestic supply of fish through distant water fishing and 
aquaculture (which also still relies in part on wild- caught fish for feed 
(FAO, 2018)). Consequently, a greater number of conflict incidences 
could be the end result of local scarcities that are masked in the do-
mestic supply variable.
For time period 2, we also found that as the quantity of protein 
derived from fish consumption in a country increased, so did the 
occurrence of conflict over fishery resources. The PDP shows that 
this relationship mainly holds true for higher levels of protein con-
sumption from fish (over 20 g/capita/day) (Figure 4), suggesting that 
countries whose populations rely heavily on fish for food experience 
more conflict to ensure demand for fish is met. Fish, derived from 
both wild capture fisheries and aquaculture, are an important source 
of protein: In 2015, they accounted for about 17 percent of the global 
population's intake of animal protein (note that this percentage also 
includes consumption of inland catches, though they only represent 
about 12.8 percent of total catches) (FAO, 2018). Moreover, per 
capita fish consumption is growing. It averaged 9.9 kg in the 1960s, 
grew to 20.2 kg in 2015, and preliminary estimates indicate further 
growth (FAO, 2016). This growth in demand is reportedly due to ur-
banization and increasing living standards in developing countries 
(Béné, 2015). The rising demand for fish is an important driver for 
the expansion of the Chinese DWF industry (Mallory, 2013), and is 
reported to make IUU fishing profitable (Sumaila et al., 2006).
4.3 | Evaluating the evidence for scarcity- 
induced conflict
For the first time period, we found no evidence that any type of 
scarcity, neither demand- nor supply- induced scarcity, is a signifi-
cant predictor for increased conflicts over fishery resources. For the 
second time period, we did find evidence for the demand- induced 
scarcity hypothesis and evidence that goes against the logic of the 
supply- induced scarcity hypothesis, and seemingly in support of the 
resource abundance hypothesis that links increased availability of 
resources to conflict. Support for the demand- induced scarcity hy-
pothesis suggests that countries whose populations rely heavily on 
fish for food experience more conflict to ensure demand for fish is 
met. However, the demand- induced scarcity hypothesis only holds 
if this rise in demand is combined with an insufficient rise in supply. 
As discussed previously, despite an escalation in global fishing ef-
fort, global wild catch volumes are shrinking, suggesting there is not 
enough supply for the demand and thus negating the resource abun-
dance hypothesis. For example, it is reported that China (the country 
in most conflict during this time period) has experienced declining 
returns of wild catch from its own EEZ while simultaneously demand 
for fishery resources is increasing (Agnew et al., 2009; Blomeyer 
et al., 2012; FAO, 2018; Li & Amer, 2015). Nonetheless, largely due 
to the increased availability of cultured fish, global supply of fish 
continues to increase. Could this increase in supply of cultured fish 
fulfil demand and buffer against conflicts over wild- caught, marine 
fish? This is a complex issue to be considered more rigorously by 
fisheries conflict scholars. Here, we offer two reasons why an in-
crease in supply from aquaculture might not (yet) act as a buffer.
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First, perhaps fish supplied by aquaculture does not fully sub-
stitute certain popular and highly valuable or culturally sought- after 
marine species obtained through wild capture, so aquaculture might 
not prevent conflicts over such stocks. For example, squid (families 
Gonatidae, Loliginidae, Ommastrephidae, Onychoteuthidae) are in 
high demand in countries such as Japan and China. Because cepha-
lopod aquaculture production is not significant enough to meet de-
mand (Cai & Leung, 2017), pressure on major squid species remains 
high (only about 14 percent of global squid production is deemed sus-
tainable or improving, see Sustainable Fisheries Partnership, 2019). 
The IFCD has tracked conflict events related to squid, triggered by 
illegal fishing. Second, aquaculture itself still in part relies on supply 
from wild catch. Fish oil and fishmeal, produced from marine fish, 
are important inputs into aquaculture systems. Therefore, though 
the total supply of fish is increasing, the decline in availability of ma-
rine, wild- caught fish in combination with growing demand is still 
capable of spurring conflict. These dynamics indicate that the re-
lationship between availability of fishery resources and conflict is 
even less straightforward than generally thought. Indeed, variables 
such as the value of, or cultural preferences for, particular species 
continue to play a more important role in the occurrence of conflict 
and could be just as important as overall resource availability (Crona 
et al., 2020; Gallo- Cajiao et al., 2020).
4.4 | Limitations and recommendations
There are a few important limitations to our study. First, the IFCD 
itself has limitations, as it likely under- reports conflicts in countries 
with primarily non- English speaking news media, such as parts of 
South America and Africa (Spijkers et al., 2019). It also does not in-
clude cooperative events over fishery resources. To better under-
stand how often states collaborate on fishery issues rather than 
experience conflict over them, we need comprehensive longitudinal 
data on existing transboundary fishery treaties (Brochmann, 2012; 
Mitchell & Zawahri, 2014; Yoffe et al., 2004). This could also clarify 
whether there are shared predictors between conflict and coop-
eration. Second, because we were interested in how country- level 
characteristics influence conflict, we executed a monadic analysis. 
However, this analysis does not address potential relational aspects 
of fisheries conflict, for which dyadic analyses would be necessary. 
Third, there is a need to better understand if certain predictors would 
have a stronger relationship with conflict if they were lagged over a 
certain amount of time, indicating delayed effects of certain predic-
tors. Finding the correct time lags for conflict research is a persistent 
issue (Selby & Hoffman, 2014, 2016). Fourth, the domestic supply 
data set, which includes wild capture and cultured products as well 
as fish imports, could be masking actual declines in local resources. 
Efforts are, therefore, needed to look further into the supply- induced 
scarcity hypothesis, and particularly how supply and demand for spe-
cific species might interact with monetary value or cultural demand 
to produce conflict. Fifth, predictors such as the democracy and mili-
tary expenditure here might not have shown a significant relationship 
with conflict occurrence, but they might be better predictors of con-
flict intensity (Daniels & Mitchell, 2017; Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998; 
Hegre, 2014). Last, we find unexplained variance in the data across all 
models, which could indicate that we are missing (important) predic-
tors. Possible other predictors are discussed below.
First, more precise indicators of state capacity other than the 
traditional democracy level indicator could have strong relation-
ships with conflict (Homer- Dixon, 1999). The World Governance 
Indicators could be a good starting point, but they have limited tem-
poral coverage (from 1995 onwards) and, when we incorporate them 
into our analysis for time 2, the data set exhibits a high level of col-
linearity with the democracy level variable. Similarly, more granular 
variables of economic development (and dependence) might also be 
a promising avenue. Second, the number of shared rivers has been 
used as an important predictor for dyad- conflict in the freshwater 
conflict literature (Brochmann, 2012). Preliminary findings of anal-
yses looking into shared fish stocks indicate that this variable could 
be an important indicator (Palacios- Abrantes et al., submitted), but 
as of yet, no long time series data set is available. Third, fleet size 
and fishing effort (or naval capabilities, see data set by Crisher & 
Souva, 2014) are likely to be important determinants for conflict oc-
currence, but only limited data on fleet size is available (source: the 
OECD), precluding their inclusion in our analyses.
We recommend four avenues of inquiry to guide future work on 
fisheries and conflict. First, greater disaggregation (higher analytical 
resolution) of explanatory variables and better recognition of local 
circumstances, including explicit consideration of geographic loca-
tion and context (such as available technologies), may make patterns 
clearer and easier to understand. Exploring spatial aspects associated 
with international fisheries conflict is an important next step (e.g. 
to test the “distance and contiguity” argument, which specifies that 
countries in closer proximity will experience more conflict), and for 
which the literature on water conflict provides important insights 
(Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2020; Wolf et al., 2003). Second, gathering 
more data on fisheries conflict from local to international scales, 
and establishing international teams that can align data- gathering 
methods and compile large data sets, will greatly improve our under-
standing of conflict drivers across time, scales and geography. Third, 
looking at the characteristics of fishery resources themselves and 
how they influence conflict is an unexplored avenue. Characteristics 
such as the fish's value, its legal status, or its spatial variability, could 
be informative for their relationship to conflict. Last, we suggest fur-
ther research is conducted not only on the predictors found to be 
significant, but also those predictors that had less support for their 
relationship with conflict in our analyses, such as measures of democ-
racy, employment or militarization, particularily as potential media-
tors of conflict intensity.
5  | CONCLUSION
The role of natural resources in sparking conflict is contested. 
Particularly for fishery resources, declines in abundance are often 
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assumed to incite increased competition over valuable, dwindling 
stocks. In this paper, we aimed to identify which variables are sig-
nificant predictors of historical international fishery conflict to 
parse out what might be driving fisheries conflicts to help inform 
approaches that might anticipate and prevent them. Although we 
did not find a relationship between decreased availability of fish 
and increased conflict, we cannot entirely discount this hypoth-
esis. Instead, we argue that reality is more nuanced and complex. 
Conflict might still result from local declines in wild catch, and an 
increase in global fish supplies (largely attributable to gains from 
aquaculture and increased DWF activities) might mask this reality. 
However, this does leave the literature to grapple with the role that 
cultured fish might play in mediating the relationship between de-
clining wild fish supplies and conflict. As discussed, increased fish 
supplies from aquaculture could in theory act as a buffer for con-
flicts over wild- caught fish, yet some wild- caught species might not 
be substitutable by cultured species (such as, perhaps, certain wild 
fish of high monetary value or of cultural importance). Indeed, pay-
ing attention to the effects of cultural preferences and traditions 
in mediating the fishery resource- conflict pathway is an important 
next step in understanding what drives conflicts over fish. Overall, 
parsing out more nuanced pathways between changes in available 
fish supplies and conflict will be an interesting avenue for future 
scholarship.
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